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Abstract. The present study focuses on the defining characteristic and variegation 
of direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) as laid out by Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga’ 
rgyal-mtshan (1182–1251) in the first eight verses of the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter in 
his Tshad-ma rigs pa’i gter. As is well known, direct perception along with inference 
(rjes dpag, anumāna) make up the two means of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) 
according the Buddhist system of epistemology initiated by the renowned Buddhist 
philosopher Dignāga (circa 480–540) and expanded and further developed by his 
indirect follower Dharmakīrti (mid-7th century). Each of these means of valid cognition 
is restricted to its respective objects (prameya, gzhal bya); the specifically characterised 
object (rang mtshan, svalakṣaṇa) is the object of a direct perception and the generally 
characterised object (spyi mtshan, sāmānyalakṣaṇa) is the object for an inference.
Whereas Sakya Paṇḍita’s (hereafter Sa Paṇ) efforts to protect Tibet from a Mongol 
invasion are known and have long established his importance in the political and 
diplomatic realm, the depth of his intellectual prowess and ability to synthesise Indo-
Tibetan Buddhist epistemology, culminating in the Tshad-ma rigs pa’i gter (hereafter 
TMRG),1 remain under-appreciated. According to tradition, Sa Paṇ commenced the 
study of epistemology at the age of 17 to 19 (ca. 1199–1201) while still a lay follower 
(upāsaka). Sa Paṇ initially undertook the study of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya 
(hereafter P.Vin) with Mthur-ston Gzhon-nu seng-ge and sometime later with Rstags 
Dbang-phyug seng-ge (cf. Introduction in Go-rams pa 1975; van der Kuijp 1979; 
van der Kujip 1983, 97–9). Sa Paṇ was not satisfied with what he was being taught 
1 In this study the following versions of the Tshad ma rigs-pa’i gter are utilised: first, Sa-skya 
Paṇḍita’s Tshad ma rigs-pa’i gter root text and auto-commentary (rang ‘grel) contained in a single 
volume (Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005); (note: unless otherwise noted, the Chengtu edition of Sa Paṇ’s root 
text and commentary serve as the primary referenced text cited as TMRG and TMRGRG respective-
ly); second, the Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter root text contained in the Sa-skya-pa’i bka’-‘bum, vol. 5 (Sa-
skya Paṇḍita 1968); third, the Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter contained in the Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter-gyer 
rang-gi ‘grel-pa in the Sa-skya-pa’i bka’-‘bum, vol. 5 (Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968); fourth, the Tshad ma 
rigs pa’i gter, xylographic print from blocks preserved at Simtokha, near Thimphu, Bhutan (Sa-skya 
Paṇḍita 1976).
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by these teachers; he thought that foreign (non-Buddhist) elements had crept into the 
teaching and that the true intent of Dharmakīrti was not being taught.2 Due to his 
dissatisfaction with what he was being taught, Sa Paṇ decided to travel to Chu-mig 
ring mo, where the great Kashmiri Paṇḍita Śākyaśrībhadra (?–?1225) had taken up 
residence and teaching. Śākyaśrībhadra arrived in Tibet in 1204 after fleeing India 
as a result of invading Muslim forces destroying Buddhist monasteries circa 1197, 
including Nālandā where he was the last abbot.3 Arriving at Chu-mig ring mo in 
1205, Sa Paṇ studied various topics within the field of Buddhist epistemology under 
the tutelage of Śākyaśrībhadra, as well as others in the entourage such as the Nepali 
Pandita Sanghaśrī (Saṃghaśrī), Danaśrī (Dānaśīla), and Sugataśrī. Eventually, 
circa 1210, Sa Paṇ collaborated with Śākyaśrībhadra to retranslate Dharmakīrti’s 
Pramāṇavarttika (hereafter PV). The PV superseded the P.Vin as the foremost logical 
text in Tibet as a result of this retranslation (Roerich 1976, 335; see also van der Kujip 
1979, 409; Introduction in Go-rams pa 1975; Jackson 1987, 25).4
In 1219, after being exposed to and studying Buddhist epistemology for 
approximately 22 years, at the age of 38 Sa Paṇ decided to compose the TMRG 
without relying on any of the preceding Sanskrit or Tibetan commentarial literature 
on Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s work. Sa Paṇ employed the primary texts authored by 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to substantiate his points. Through composing the TMRG, Sa 
Paṇ hoped to establish the system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in Tibet and to correct 
what he considered to be the improper understanding of the meaning of Dignāga’s 
Pramāṇasamuccaya (often simply referred to the Pramāṇa Sūtra in Tibet; hereafter 
PS) and Dharmakīrti’s Seven Texts (sde-bdun).5 As noted by van der Kuijp, by means 
of the TMRG, Sa Paṇ also expected to refute those Tibetan scholars who viewed the 
2 There is certainly reason to suspect that Sa Paṇ was dissatisfied due to non-Buddhist ele-
ments being present in the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s work. While Śāntarakṣita (725–83) and 
Kamalaśīla (740–95) were instrumental in establishing Buddhist epistemology during the first pe-
riod of Buddhism in Tibet, their lineage was broken at the close of the first period. During the second 
period of Buddhism in Tibet, Rngog lo-tsa ba Blo-ldan shes rab (1059–1109) played a pivotal role in 
once again establishing the teaching of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya. One 
of Rngog lo-tsa ba’s primary teachers was the Kashmiri logician Bhagiraja, who was a late convert to 
Buddhism. Therefore, some remnants of Hindu logic are said to have remained in his understanding 
and instruction of Buddhist logic (see Introduction in Go-rams pa 1975).
3 Circa 1197 Ikhtiyara Uddin Muhammad ibn-Bakhtayar destroyed two great Buddhist univer-
sities, Nālandā and Vikramaśīla. Śākyaśrībhadra departed Nālandā after the raid by ibn-Bakhtayar 
and went to Jaggadala Mahāvihāra (Bengal) where he stayed for approximately three years un-
til that state fell, whereupon he went to Nepal. Circa 1200 the Tibetan scholar Khro-phu invited 
Śākyaśrībhadra to travel to Tibet (see Dhar 2004, 35).
4 It should also be noted that per Jackson 1987, 35, n. 35, Śākyaśrībhadra served as the upādhyāya 
in the ordination of Sa Paṇ as a monk circa 1208.
5 In addition to the PV and the P.Vin, the seven texts of Dharmakīrti also include the following: 
Nyāyabindu (rigs pa thigs pa); Sambandhaparīkṣā (‘brel ba brtag pa); Hetubindu (gtan tshigs thigs 
pa); Vādanyāya (rtsod pa’i tshigs rigs pa); Santānāntara-siddhi (rgyud gzhan grub pa).
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works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti through the influence of Rngog Lo-tsa-ba (van der 
Kujip 1983, 101).6 The TMRG critically comments on the views of two of the most 
renowned adherents of Rngog Lo tsa ba’s interpretation, to wit, Phya pa chos kyi seng 
ge (1109–69) and Gtsang nag pa brtson ‘grus seng ge (12th century). While neither 
Phya pa (sometimes Cha ba) nor Gtsang nag pa are specifically mentioned by Sa Paṇ 
in relation to the eight verses under consideration either in the TMRG or his Tshad-ma 
rigs pa’i gter rang ’grel (hereafter TMRGRG), Go-rams pa directly refers to Phya pa 
as the target of Sa Paṇ’s criticism with regard to his explanation of the opening verse 
in the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter.7
Root text and commentaries
With respect to textual materials currently extant, Sa Paṇ’s TMRG, along with his 
TMRGRG, represent the first effort in Tibet to focus on and examine the considerable 
earlier body of Indian works concentrating on Buddhist logic and epistemology. While 
Sa Pan’s abilities were celebrated and his re-translation of Dharmakīrti’s PV with 
Sakyaśrī was highly regarded, the depth and scope of Sa Paṇ’s genius as reflected in 
the TMGR was not immediately forthcoming. Near-term Tibetan scholars following 
soon after Sa Paṇ viewed this work skeptically and interest in the TMRG dimmed in 
the 13th and 14th centuries. Only at the conclusion of the 14th century and the outset of 
the 15th century did interest in the TMRG begin in earnest following the appearance 
of Gyag ston sangs rgyas dpal’s (1348–1414) Sde bdun gyi dgongs ‘grel tshad ma 
rigs pa’i gter gyi de kho na nyid gsal bar byed pa rigs pa’i ‘od stong (Radiating a 
Thousand Lights, (A Commentary) Illumining the Suchness of (Sa Paṇ’s) Tshad-
ma rigs pa’i gter, A Commentary on the Intention of (Dharmakīrti’s) Seven Texts) 
(see Jackson 1987, 137–38). In this work, Gyag ston chastised Tibetan scholars for 
not understanding Dharmakīrti’s system and those Tibetans who followed Phya pa’s 
Bsdus pa (Summaries), which he believed misrepresented Dharmakīrti’s system and 
Sa Paṇ’s synthesis of that system (Dreyfus 1997, 24). 
The TMRG consists of eleven chapters (rab byed) that constitute a topical 
commentary analysing the main philosophical issues encountered in the works of 
6 Cf. also van der Kuijp 1979, 409 regarding gser-mdog Paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan’s com-
ment that Sa Paṇ composed the TMRG after concluding that Phya-pa’s ‘Summaries of Logic’ (tshad 
bsdus) did not agree (mi mthun pa) with the basic texts (gzhung), i.e. the works of Dignāga and 
Dharmakīrti.
7 See Go-rams pa 1975, 125, where Phya and others (phya pa sogs) are identified as those to 
whom Sa Paṇ aims his rejection of their defining characteristic (mthsan nyid, lakṣaṇa) of direct per-
ception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa). See TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226, where Sa Paṇ simply 
identifies generic Tibetans (bod rnams) as the subjects of his criticism.
56 B R U C E  J .  S T E WA R T
 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.8 The TMRG, like other texts discussing issues relating to 
epistemology, is composed in extremely terse and didactic verse that presupposes 
the reader/audience possesses previous knowledge of the topic under examination. 
Without the aid of a commentary (‘grel pa, vṛtti), understanding the nuanced meaning 
and the philosophical background of a root text (mūla, rtsa) examining subjects such 
as direct perception or inference are unlikely. Therefore, in order to fully develop the 
intended meaning and context of Sa Pan’s discussion of the defining characteristic 
(mtshan nyid, lakṣaṇa) and variegation (dbye ba) of direct perception as presented 
in the first eight verses of his ‘Direct Perception’ chapter, two commentaries on the 
TMRG are employed in this investigation: Sa Paṇ’s own auto-commentary entitled 
Tshad-ma rigs pa’i gter rang ‘grel (TMRGRG) and the sub-commentary by Kun-
mkhyen Go-rams pa Bsod nams seng ge (1419–1489) entitled Sde bdun mdo dang 
bcas pa’i dgongs pa phyin ci ma log par ’grel ma tshad pa rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal 
bar byed pa (Clarifying the meaning of Tshad-ma rigs pa’i gter which unerringly 
explains the intention of [Dharmakīrti’s] Seven Texts along with [Dignāga’s] Sutra) 
(TMRGDG).9 Go-rams pa also wrote a second commentary on the TMRG entitled 
Tshad -ma rigs pa’i gter gyi dka ba’i gnas rnam parbshad pa sde bdun rab gsal (The 
Explanation of the difficult sections of the Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter which completely 
clarifies [Dharmakīrti’s] Seven Texts) (Go-rams pa 1969b).
In addition to Sa Paṇ’s auto-commentary and Go-rams pa’s two commentaries, 
numerous other commentaries have been written on the TMRG, both by followers of 
the Sa skya sect as well as by authors belonging to other sects of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Notable among other Sa skya commentators on the TMRG is the work by one of Go 
rams-pa’s chief 15th century rivals, Śākya Mchog ldan (1428–1507), entitled Tshad 
ma rigs gter gyi dgongs rgyan rigs pa’i ’khor los lugs ngan pham byed (Defeater of 
Bad Systems Through the Wheel of Reasoning, an Ornament to the Ideas of the 
Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter) (Śākya Mchog ldan 1975). From the rival Ge luk pa school 
there is the work of one of Tsong kha pa’s principal adherents, Rgyal tshap Rje Dar 
ma rin chen (1364–1432), entitled Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi rnam bshad legs par 
8 The following is a complete list of the eleven chapters of the TMRG and where they are 
discussed in Go-rams pa 1975 (TMRGDG): 1. ‘The Object of Cognition’ (shes bya’i yul), p. 2; 2. ‘The 
Mind as the Knowing Agent’ (shes byed kyi blo), p. 14; 3. ‘The Universal and the Particular’ (spyi 
dang bye brag), p. 22; 4. ‘Affirmation and Differentiation’ (sgrub pa and gzhan sel), p. 33 (note: 
Go-rams pa uses the variation snang dang sel ba when he titles the fourth chapter); 5. ‘The Object 
of Expression and the Expressor’ (brjod bya dang rjod byed), p. 48; 6. ‘Relation’ (‘brel pa), p. 59; 
7. ‘Exclusion’ (‘gal ba), p. 75, 8. ‘Defining Characteristic’ (mtshan nyid), p. 86; 9. ‘Direct Perception’ 
(mngon sum), p. 125; 10. ‘Inference for Oneself’ (rang don rjes dpag), p. 187; 11. ‘Inference for 
Others’ (gzhan don rjes dpag), p. 233.
9 Primarily utilising Go-rams pa 1975 and the TMRGDG version in Go-rams pa bsod nams seng 
ge 1969a.
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bshad pa’i snying po (Essence of Good Sayings, an Explanation of [Sa Paṇ’s] Treasure 
of the Valid Cognition).10 While the above-named commentaries, as well as others, 
are important, Go-rams-pa’s TMRGDG holds a prominent place within the Sa skya 
tradition and is considered to most clearly present the ideas of Sa Paṇ. The TMRGDG 
is still included as a central part of the curriculum in the education of Sa skya monks 
in the Sa skya monastic institutions such as Sakya College.11 
In total, the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter consists of 153 verses covering the full 
gamut of issues surrounding the topic of direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa).12 
While a skilled translator may possibly extract a cogent rendition of each verse Sa 
Paṇ employs in the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter, only with the aid of a commentary, in 
this instance Sa Paṇ’s Rang ’Grel and Go-rams pa’s sub-commentary (TMRGDG), can 
one gain the contextual and subtextual granularity supporting the intent of each verse. 
As the tip of the iceberg represents merely a minute visible aspect of the supporting 
massive ice formation beneath the surface of the water, so too does each verse finely 
crafted by Sa Paṇ with economy represent the pointy tip of a vast subtext and context 
of supporting arguments. 
Sectional titles (sa bcad)
Go-rams pa’s TMRGDG closely follows Sa Paṇ’s auto-commentary, expanding and 
amplifying where he deems necessary, sometimes adding fuller context to a topic 
merely mentioned in Sa Paṇ’s auto-commentary. Both the TMRGRG and the TMRGDG 
provide sectional titles (sa bcad) that serve as useful guides to nicely segment the 
root text verses into digestible focused units. The sectional titles specifically denote 
the issues that Sa Paṇ intends to address within each verse or groups of verses. In 
order to assist in clarifying the context and subtext surrounding the eight verses 
under consideration, the sectional titles will be included. In addition to clarifying the 
discussion, presenting the sectional titles provides an excellent example as to how 
this compositional device was utilised within this genre. The sectional titles within 
10 I have not been able to consult Rgyal tshap Rje’s text for this current study; however, Dreyfus 
1997, 584, refers to this commentary by Rgyal tshap Rje Dar ma rin chen as follows, Tshad ma rigs 
pa’i gter gyi rnam bshad legs par bshad pa’i snying po. bkra shis ‘khyil, [s.d.]; rgyalnstshab’s Rigs 
gter unambshad, Kyoto: Biblia Tibetica, 1993. See also van der Kuijp 1979, 410–1 for additional 
commentaries on the TMRG.
11 I was first introduced to Go rams pa and his TMRGDG in 1977–78 during a stay at Sakya Col-
lege, which was then located near Mussoorie, India. At that time I initially read the ‘Mngon Sum’ 
Chapter with Lama Nyima Tsang po under the direction of mKhen po Abbe. The monks at Sakya 
College utilised Go rams pa’s TMRGDG during their study of Sa Paṇ’s TMRG.
12 The ‘Mngon Sum’ chapter in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1976 inadvertently includes one verse fragment 
from the auto-commentary (i.e., mngon sum gyis grangs nges pa ni) in the root text, fol. 29.b.2; there-
fore, including the mistaken additional verse this edition has 154 verses.
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the TMRGRG and the TMRGDG are generally consistent, with Go-rams pa providing 
additional subdivisions in certain instances, again to aid clarification.
While the exact procedure for writing the sectional titles can vary, it generally 
amounts to providing a series of titles such as ‘the first (providing the specific topic 
under consideration) has three sections’, then naming the sub-topics that will be 
addressed. Later when arriving at the place in the text where that specific topic is to 
be discussed, Sa Paṇ or Go-rams pa will often simply say ‘The second is…’ (without 
restating the specific issue); in order to assist in clarity the full sectional titles will be 
inserted both when they are originally referred to as well as when the actual topic is 
discussed. Both Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa indicate that the eleven chapters of the TMRG 
root text are divided into two overall sections:
1. to ascertain the definitive conclusion in this system, having countered the universal 
as the knowable, and
2. to ascertain the essence of the means of valid cognition as the knowing agent.13
Chapters one through seven of the TMRG are examined under the first section and 
chapters eight through eleven are discussed under the second section.14 The second 
section is further divided into
2.A. to make clear the exposition of the defining characteristic, and 
2.B. to make clear the purpose of each illustration (i.e., mgnon sum and rjes dpag).15
Therefore chapter eight, ‘Defining Characteristic’ (mtshan nyid), of the TMRG 
is discussed under rubric 2.A., while our ‘Direct Perception’, chapter 9 (as well as 
chapters 10 and 11, ‘Inference for Oneself’ [rang don rjes dpag] and ‘Inference for 
Others’ [gzhan don rjes dpag] respectively), comes under 2.B.; taken as a whole, all 
153 verses of the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter provide an in-depth examination of 
the majority of the issues surrounding the place and function of direct perception as 
presented in the system put forth by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. 
With regard to the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter presented as the first topic under 
2.B., both Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa further divide the TMRG’s examination of this 
subject into the following three primary areas:
13 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 39 Go-rams pa 1975, 2; shes bya spyi ldog nas gtan la dbab 
pa dang / shes byed tshad ma pa’i rang bzhin nges par bya ba’o //.
14 Therefore, under the ‘first section’ come chapters 1. ‘The Object of Cognition’ (shes bya’i 
yul); 2. ‘The Mind as the Knowing Agent’ (shes byed kyi blo); 3. ‘The Universal and the Particular’ 
(spyi dang bye brag); 4. ‘Affirmation and Differentiation’ (sgrub pa and gzhan sel); 5. ‘The Object of 
Expression and the Expressor’ (brjod bya dang rjod byed), 6. ‘Relation’ (‘brel pa); 7. ‘Exclusion’ 
(‘gal ba). And under the ‘second section’ come chapters, 8. ‘Defining Characteristic’ (mtshan nyid); 
9. ‘Direct Perception’ (mngon sum); 10. ‘Inference for Oneself’ (rang don rjes dpag); 11. ‘Inference 
for Others’ (gzhan don rjes dpag).
15 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 178 and Go-rams pa 1975, 86: mtshan nyid kyi rnam gzhag 
dang / mtshan gzhi so so‘i don gtan la dbab pa’o //.
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2.B.1.A. Right Direct Perception (mngon sum yang dak, pratyakṣa); (covered in verses 
1–130).
2.B.1.B. Erroneous Semblance of Direct Perception (log phyogs mngon sum ltar 
snang, pratyakṣābhāsa); (covered in verses 131–6).
2.B.1.C. Means of Valid Cognition as Result (tshad ma dang ‘bras bu, pramāṇaphala); 
(covered in verse 137–53).16 Sa Paṇ’s discussion of the defining characteristic 
and varieties of direct perception are contained in the first section under the 
examination of ‘Right Direct Perception’ (2.B.1.A.).
To further particularise the investigation of ‘Right Direct Perception’, both the 
TMRGRG and the TMRGDG identify the following three subsections, to wit:
2.B.1.A.1. the defining characteristic (mtshan nyid, lakṣaṇa) of direct perception; 
(covered in verses 1–3).
2.B.1.A.2. the variegation of what is to be defined (mtshon bya, lakṣya); (covered in 
verses 4–8);
2.B.1.A.3. the purpose (don, artha) of each term (mtshan gzhi), covered in verses 
9–130.17
2.B.1.A.1. The defining characteristic of direct perception:  
Rejecting the wrong view (Verse I)
Sa Paṇ does not initiate his examination of direct perception in the TMRG as we 
might expect by stating what he considers to be pratyakṣa’s defining characteristic. In 
outlining the concerns to be addressed in order to present the defining characteristic 
of direct perception, the TMRGRG and the TMRGDG note that there are two issues to 
be resolved: 
2.B.1.A.1.A.  to reject (dgag) the views of others concerning the defining characteristic 
of direct perception, and 
2.B.1.A.1.B.  to establish (bzhag) our own defining characteristic of direct perception.18
In order to refute (under section 2.B.1.A.1.A.) the incorrect notions held by some 
Tibetans as to what constitutes the defining characteristic of direct perception, Sa Paṇ 
begins the ‘Pratyakṣa’ chapter by stating in Verse I that 
16 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226.5: mngon sum la gsum ste / mngon sum yang dag pa / 
bzlog phyogs mngon sum ltar snang / tshad ma dang ‘bral bu’o //. Go-rams pa 1975, 125.1 only varies 
in reading log phyogs for bzlog phyogs.
17 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226.7: dang po mngon sum yang dag pa gsum ste / mtshan 
nyid dang / mtshan bya’i byed ba dang / mtshan gzi so so’i don //. The discussion at hand will focus 
on the first two sections (mtshan nyid and mtshan bya’i byed ba); leaving the third section for a sub-
sequent communication.
18 Cf. TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226.9: dang po la gnyis las gzhan lugs dgag na //; and 
Go-rams pa 1975, 125.3: dang po dgag bzhag gnyis las //.
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[Claiming a direct perception as a means of valid cognition] eliminates superimposition 
due to the immediate experience being wrong.19
While Sa Paṇ simply directs his criticism at Tibetan scholars (bod rnams) in 
general, in the TMRGDG Go-rams pa distinctly identifies the intended target of Sa 
Paṇ’s criticism at Phya pa chos kyi seng ge and others (phya pa sogs).
In verse one Sa Paṇ is addressing his belief that Phya pa and others have incorrectly 
divided ‘a direct perception’ (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) and ‘a direct perception as a 
means of valid cognition’ (mngon sum tshad ma, pratyakṣa pramāṇa). According to 
both Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa, Phya pa et al. have explained the defining characteristic 
of a pratyakṣa as a cognition which is ‘free from conceptual thought and without error’ 
(rtog bral ma ‘khrul pa, kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam); while at the same time they 
have wrongly noted a ‘direct perception as a means of valid cognition’ as a pratyakṣa 
‘eliminating the superimposition (adhyāropa) through experiencing an object not 
previously comprehended’.20 For the Sakya writers following Sa Paṇ (sa lugs), Phya 
pa’s division is wrong for two primary reasons. First, the basic texts (gzhung), in this 
case Dignāga’s PS and Dharmakīrti’s PV, do not indicate a division into pratyakṣa 
and pratyakṣa-pramāṇa. Second, within a mere pratyakṣa, a cognition eliminating 
the superimposition without the presence of a cognitive operation of exclusion 
(rnam bcad) towards an object not previously comprehended is not possible. Where 
there is a cognition eliminating the superimposition, there is necessarily a cognitive 
operation of exclusion. The cognitive operation of exclusion is a conceptual activity 
and therefore cannot be present in a pratyakṣa because it violates the requirement that 
a pratyakṣa must be without conceptual thought (rtog bral; nirvikalpa). 
2.B.1.A.1.B. Establishing (bzhag) our own defining characteristic 
of direct perception
After delimiting the wrong defining characteristic of pratyakṣa put forth by others, 
Go-rams pa notes that the next issue concerning Sa Paṇ is establishment of their 
correct defining characteristic of direct perception, which will focus on two topics:
19 TMRG and TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 23.16 and 226.10, respectively: myong bas sgro 
‘dogs gcod pa ‘khrul //.
20 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226.11; TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 31a.1: bod 
rnams mngon sum dang tshad ma tha dad du phye nas / mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid rtog bral ma 
‘khrul pa dang / de’i tshad ma’i mtshan nyid sngar ma rtogs pa’i don la myong stobs kyis sgra ‘dogs 
gcod pa zhes zer ba mi ‘thad de /. Cf. Go-rams pa 1975, 125.4 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, 
fol. 61b.2, Go-rams pa identifies Phya pa and others (phya pa sogs...) as the target of Sa Paṇ criticism. 
Cf. Śākya Mchog ldan 1975, II.376.5, where Śākya Mchog ldan notes Phya pa’s definition of direct 
perception as rtog pa dang bral zhing rang gi bzung yul la ma ‘khrul pa’i rigs pa, further specifying 
the qualification that the perception is without error regarding ‘its object of apprehension’ (rang gi 
bzung yul).
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2. B.1.A.1.B.1. ascertainment of the proper defining characteristic, and 
2. B.1.A.1.B.2. ascertainment of the purpose of that defining characteristic.21
2.B.1.A.1.B.1. Ascertainment of the proper defining characteristic (Verse II)
As for pratyakṣa’s proper defining characteristic, Sa Paṇ notes in his TMRGRG that 
their own accepted (rang ‘dod pa) defining characteristic for pratyakṣa is stated in the 
TMRG, mngon sum chapter, Verse II, as
Direct perception is free from conceptual thought and without error.22
With regard to the defining characteristic as laid out by Sa Paṇ, Go-rams pa 
comments that both aspects of the defining characteristic are employed when one is 
concerned with dispelling misunderstandings (log rtog sel ba). Alternatively, when 
one is concerned with eliminating dissimilar types (rigs mi mthun sel ba), ‘a cognition 
that is without error’ can be employed as the defining characteristic of pratyakṣa.23
Furthermore, while citing Dharmakīrti’s P.Vin (‘Pratyakṣa’ chapter, 4.a.) on the 
definition of direct perception (to wit, mngon sum rtog bral ma ‘khrul ba), Go-rams 
pa reiterates that the defining characteristic of direct perception as a means of valid 
cognition (mngon sum tshad ma, pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) is the same as the defining 
characteristic of direct perception. Go-rams pa highlights that the definition of direct 
perception offered by Dharmakīrti is recognised as being a means of valid cognition 
because it not stated that there is a different defining characteristic regarding mngon 
sum tshad ma (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa).24
21 Go-rams pa 1975, 125.10; TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 61b.4: gnyis pa la mtshan nyid 
dngos dang / de’i don nges par bya ba gnyis las /.
22 TMRG and TMRGRG (both in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005), p. 23.16 and p. 226.16 respectively: 
mngon sum rtog bral ma ‘khrul ba /. See also, Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1976, fol. 29a.6. It is well known that 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s definition of pratyakṣa differed. In the Pramāṇasamuccaya, ‘Pratyakṣa’ 
chapter, verse 2, Dignāga defines direct perception as ‘free from conceptual thought’ (rtog pa dang 
‘bral mngon sum, pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham). Whereas Dharmakīrti not only has kalpanāpoḍham, 
he also adds ‘without error’ (ma ‘khrul ba, abhranta) to his definition. See Wayman 1977–78, 391, 
where Wayman points out that Dharmakīrti was actually reinstating the characteristic of ‘without 
error’ from the earlier ‘Hetuvidyā’ section of Asaṅga’s Yogācārabhūmi; where the term is actually 
avibhrānta. It should be noted that Dharmakirit’s definition of pratyakṣa as kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntam 
occurs in his Nyāyabindu and Pramāṇaviniścaya; see Dharmakīriti 1954, ‘Pratyakṣa’ chapter Verse 
4, and Vetter 1966, 40.
23 A more detailed discussion as to what Go-rams pa intends when referring to ‘eliminates dis-
similar types’ and ‘dispelling misunderstandings’ is discussed below in section 2.B.1.A.1.B.2.B. (As-
certaining the purpose of ‘without error’) and 2.B.1.A.1.B.2.C. (Ascertaining the purpose of both 
‘without conceptual and without error’) respectively. Briefly, ‘eliminates dissimilar types’ refers to 
those perceptions that arise as erroneous through the causes of error situated in the sense basis, 
etc. (i.e. pratyakṣa-abhāsa), and ‘dispelling misunderstandings’ concerns criticism of the parameters 
placed on perception by the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika.
24 Go-rams pa 1975, 125.14; Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 61b.5: mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid yin zhing 
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2.B.1.A.1.B.2. Ascertainment of the purpose of that defining characteristic
The TMRGDR notes that in order to ascertain the correct defining characteristic it is 
necessary to understand the purpose of the definition as presented. To accomplish 
this, Go-rams pa outlines three areas that need to be reviewed, to wit,
 A. ascertaining the meaning of ‘free from conceptual thought’;
 B. ascertaining the meaning of ‘without error’; 
 C. ascertaining the purpose of both ‘without conceptual and without error’.25
2.B.1.A.1.B.2.A. Ascertaining the meaning of ‘free from conceptual thought’ 
(Verse III)
When initiating the examination of the meaning of ‘free from conceptual thought’, 
Sa Paṇ’s TMRGRD comments that the defining characteristic of conceptual thought 
explained in the scripture (lung, āgama) as ‘all conceptual thought are erroneous’ is 
not only referring to a ‘course cognition’ (sems rtsing), such as cognitive acts and 
mental states (sems dang sems byung).26 In the TMRG, Verse III of the ‘Pratyakṣa’ 
chapter, Sa Paṇ indicates another variety of kalpanā (rtog pa) as that stipulated by 
Dharmakīrti with respect to its absence in direct perception, stating ‘conceptual 
thought apprehends the object associated with words’.27
In commenting on Sa Paṇ’s Verse III, Go-rams pa follows Sa Paṇ and states that 
the conceptual thought that should be absent in pratyakṣa is the conceptual thought 
that apprehends the object associated with words (sgra don, śabda-artha).28
/ de nyid mngon sum tshad ma’i mtshan nyid kyang yin te / rnam nges las / mngon sum rtog bral ma 
‘khrul ba / zhes gsungs pa’i phyir /de nyid tshad ma yin pa’i dbang du byas nas / mngon sum tshad ma 
la mtshan nyid gzhan ma gsungs pa’i phyir ro /.
25 Anent the issue of ascertaining the purpose of the two components of the direct perception, 
Sa Paṇ also notes that one examines both ‘free from conceptual thought’ and ‘without error’ when 
seeking the purpose of that definition depending on the terms. Cf TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 
226.17; TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 31a.3: de ni ming la brten nas don tshol ba yin pas 
rtog pa dang bral ba dang / ma ‘khrul pa gnyis dpyad do /.
26 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226.18; TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 31a.4: de 
‘ng rtog pa’i mtshad nyid lung las grags pa yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun tu rtog pa dang sems rtsing 
par ‘jug pa tsam ma yin gyi /. Cf. Glo-bo Mkhan-chen 1988, 181: gnyis pa la rtog pa ni lung las grags 
pa / yang dag ma yin kun rtog ni / sems dang sems byung khams gsum pa / zhes yang dag pa ma yin 
pa’i kun rtog dang / rtog dang dpyod pa rtsing zhib nyid / ces rtsing bar ‘jug pa’i rnam pa can dang 
/ sgra don ‘dzin pa’i rtog pa ste gsum yod pa las / snga ma gnyis tsam min gyi sgra don ‘dzin pa ste / 
rnam ‘grel las / shes gang gang las sgra don ‘dzin...
27 See TMRG and TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 23.17 and 226.20 respectively: rtog pa sgra 
don ‘dzin pa yin //. See also Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1976, fol. 29b.1.
28 Go-rams pa paraphrases Sa Paṇ as follows: dang po la bral bya rtog pa ni / sgra don ‘dzin pa’i 
rtog pa ste /, Go-rams pa 1975, 125.18 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 61b.6–62.a.1. As Go-
rams pa’s comment suggests and as will be seen, there are numerous varieties of conceptual thought 
(rtog pa, kalpanā); in the current discussion it is that type of conceptual thought which is to be absent 
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In support of his presentation of conceptual thought and in acknowledment of 
the nuanced approach regarding conceptual thought, the TMRGRG, as well as Go-
rams pa’s TMRGDG, cites the same two instances where Dharmakīrti presents two 
somewhat differing notions about what constitutes conceptual thought and seemingly 
should be absent in a direct perception; namely, PV (‘Pratyakṣa’ 287.a–b):
Whatever the cognition and wherever its apprehension of the object associated with words, 
in that there is said to be conceptual thought.29
And in the P.Vin, while commenting on ‘Pratyakṣa’ 4.b, stating:
Conceptual thought is cognition in which a representation is capable of being associated 
with verbalisation.30
in direct perception that is examined. For additional types of conceptual thought cf. for example 
Hattori 1965; here Hattori cites the Sanskrit (corrected from the form in Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya) 
of Dignāga’s Svavṛtti on his Pramāṇasamuccaya, I.8cd–9ab, which identifies three types of kalpanā:
tatra bhrāntijñānaṃ mṛgatṛṣṇādisu toyādikalpanā
pravṛttatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam saṃvṛtisajjñānam
saṃvṛtisatsu arthāntarāropāt. tadrūpakalpanā-
pravṛttatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam anumāna-tatphalādi-
jñānam pūrvānubhūta-kalpanāyeti na pratyakṣam. 
(While Dignāga’s primary intent in the above passage is to outline the ‘semblance of direct per-
ception’ (mngon sum ltar snang, pratyakṣabhasa), in the course of providing this overview, Dignāga 
notes the functional theme of three types of kalpanā, to wit, bhrāntijñānam (erroneous cognition), 
saṃvṛtisajjñānam (cognition of conventional existence), and anumāna-tatphalādi-jñānam (cogni-
tion of inference, its results, etc.).) See also Tsong-kha pa’s Sde bdun la ‘jug pa’i sgo don gnyer yid 
mun sel as translated by Wayman 1999, 277–79, where Tsong-kha pa presents various types of kal-
panā.
29 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226.22–3; TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 31a.4: 
shes gang gang la sgra don ‘dzin / de ni de la rtog par brjod /; Sanskrit of this verse is found in Shastri 
1968, 185: śabdārthagrahi yad yatra taj jñānaṁ tatra kalpanā / k. 287.a–b, as well as in Miyasaka 
1971–72, 81. Sa Paṇ’s inclusion of brjod in 287.b. varies from the Tibetan in Miyasaka’s PV-kārikā 
edition, which has pāda 287.b as de ni de la rtog pa yin. Go-rams pa follows this (PV-kārikā) reading, 
Go-rams pa 1975, 125.22 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 62.a.1. It can be noted, however, 
that Manorathanandin’s vṛtti on 287.b reads: …tatra kalpanocyate; thereby perhaps presaging Sa 
Paṇ’s use of brjod (ucyate).
30 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226.24–5; TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 1968, 
fol. 31a.5: rtog pa ni brjod pa dang ‘drer rung bar snang ba’i shes pa. Omitting ‘snang ba’ 
from his rendering of Dharmakīrti’s P.Vin comment, Go-rams pa 1975, 125.22 and TMRGDG in 
Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 62.a.1, reads rtog pa ni brjod pa dang ‘drer rung ba’i shes pa ste /. This 
verse appears also in Dharmakīrti 1954, ‘Pratyakṣa’ chapter, verse 5, with the Sanskrit reading 
abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsa pratītiḥ kalpanā /. Compare also the reconstructed Sanskrit for 
P.Vin, ‘Prat.’ 4.b comment in Vetter 1966, 40.
As presented in Obermiller 1931, 45, Dharmakīrti’s P.Vin can be viewed as a commentary on 
Dignāga’ PS: ‘“The Pramāṇa-viniścaya”, says the Kashmirian Pandit Jñānaśrī, “is not to be regarded 
as a commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya; nevertheless, I shall elucidate its theory”. The teacher 
Dharmottara, on the contrary says it is a commentary on the work in question, and this opinion is to 
be regarded as correct’. Therefore, it may be possible to view Dharmakīrti’s P.Vin ‘Prat.’ 4.b com-
ment regarding ‘conceptual thought’ as referring to Dignāga’s PS ‘Prat.’ verse 2.c–d: min dang rigs 
sbyor ba yi / rtog pa dang bral mngon sum mo // (Direct perception is free from conceptual thought 
that adds a name, (nāma, ming) and class (jāti, rigs), etc). While not actually defining ‘conceptual 
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As Dreyfus rightly points out, in laying out the above two notions, Dharmakīrti 
indicated the close connection between conceptual thought and universals on the one 
hand and with language in the second instance. While the two notions do not conflict, 
they do tend to emphasise different aspects of conceptual thought (Dreyfus 1997, 220). 
In the first instance cited from PV, Dharmakīrti points out the object of conceptual 
thought as an object that is associated with words and can be viewed as a universal 
(spyi, sāmānya). In his 11th century work entitled Tarkabhāṣā, Mokṣākaragupta notes 
that this variety of conceptual thought is evidenced by a clever man’s comprehension 
in the form ‘this is a jar’ (Kajiyama 1966, 41). This notion falls squarely in the 
Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition, which has the universal as the object of the conceptual 
inference (rjes dpag, anumāna) and the particular (rang mtshan, svalakṣaṇa) as the 
object of a non-conceptual perception. In his later P.Vin, Dharmakīrti points out the 
relationship between conceptual thought and expression (brjod pa, abhilāpa). 
Even though Sa Paṇ acknowledged the two significant aspects of conceptual 
thought as presented by Dharmakīrti in relation to pratyakṣa (mngon sum) by 
referring to verse PV ‘Pratyakṣa’ 287 and P.Vin ‘Pratyakṣa’ 4, he seemingly took 
the positive step to emphasise the defining characteristic of conceptual thought as 
presented in the PV, in his Verse III of the TMRG’s ‘Mngon Sum’ chapter: conceptual 
thought apprehends ‘the object associated with words’ (sgra don, śabdārtha), thereby 
apparently signaling this aspect of conceptual thought as representing Dharmakīrti’s 
focus in this case. 
With respect to the notions of conceptual thought presented in the PV and P.Vin, 
considerable discussion ensued about how to properly interpret śabdārtha (sgra don) 
as the defining characteristic of conceptual thought in the PV as well as the purpose 
of yogya (rung ba) (capable) noted as a characteristic of conceptual thought in the 
P.Vin. While neither Sa Paṇ nor Go-rams pa dwell on these two issues at this point in 
the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter, they do address the issues and state their positions. 
As would be expected, when Sa Paṇ elaborates on Dharmakīrti’s two explanations 
of conceptual thought in his 13th century TMRGRD, he focuses on early Indian and 
Tibetan authors such as Śāntarakṣita and Phya pa respectively. And by the time Go-
rams pa addresses these issues in the 15th century, he not only includes the earlier 
references denoted by Sa Paṇ, but there are indications that he also takes into account 
developments put forth by Tibetan Ge luk pa writers such as Rgyal tshab dar ma rin 
thought’, but rather laying out examples of what constitutes kalpanā, Dignāga’s comment led to 
extensive criticism from opponents such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who claimed that the inclusion of 
jāti implied Dignāga’s acceptance as of them as real. Dharmakīrti’s PV’s explanation rectifies this vul-
nerability by limiting ‘conceptual thought’ as being capable of being associated with verbalisation. 
While further discussion of this issue is beyond the present scope of this investigation, for a more 
detailed examination see Vyas 1991, 33–92.
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chen (1364–1432), Mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang po (1385–1438), and Dge ‘dun 
grub pa (1391–1474).
Anent the defining characteristic of kalpanā as presented in PV 287 and in a 
possible rebuff of Phya pa, Sa Paṇ states that it is not necessary to include an object-
universal (don spyi, artha sāmānya) as the object of conceptual thought in addition 
to the śabdārtha.31 Sa Paṇ discredits the argument put forth by those who say that 
it is necessary to include the qualification that conceptual thought apprehends the 
object-universal (don spyi, artha sāmānya) in order to respond to those who argue 
that conceptual thought that apprehends the object associated with words (śabdārtha) 
does not cover the instance when non-Buddhists (mu stegs, tīrthika) accept that sense 
cognition possesses conceptual thought. Seemingly indicating that Dharmakīrti’s 
verse is not meant to be all inclusive, Sa Paṇ notes that even if the above criticism is 
true, a similar criticism can be put forth concerning PV verse 287, when it is said that 
conceptual thought that apprehends the object associated with words (sdra don ‘dzin 
pa) does not cover the case regarding the conceptual thought of one who is ignorant 
about conventional signs.32 
The issue of the ‘conceptual thought of one who is ignorant of conventional 
signs’, i.e. language, is more directly addressed, albeit briefly, when Sa Paṇ and Go-
rams pa examine the purported purpose concerning why Dharmakīrti includes the 
requirement ‘capable’ (rung ba, yogya) in the P.Vin’s definition of conceptual thought, 
to wit, ‘a cognition (in which a representation) is capable of being associated with 
verbalisation’. Initiating the discussion, Sa Paṇ, again employing the generic kha cig, 
notes that some scholars say Dharmakīrti utilised the phrase ‘apprehension capable 
of being associated’ (‘drer rung ‘dzin pa) with verbalisation in order to include in his 
definition the conceptual thought of one who is ignorant of conventional signs. Sa Paṇ 
points out that the above does not cover the case where there is in fact ‘apprehension 
associating’ (‘dres pa ‘dzin pa) with verbalisation. Acknowledging that some scholars 
say that there is no controversy (mi ‘gal) by recognising the cognition in which there 
is in fact an ‘apprehension associating’ with verbalisation, Sa Paṇ concludes that there 
is no opposition regardless of whether the term ‘capable’ (rung) is included or not 
31 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226.25; TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 31a.5: don 
spyi ‘dzin pa zhes brjod kyang de nyid las ma ‘das so /. Cf. Tillemans 1999, 234, n. 15. Tillemans notes 
that in Rigs gter and Rigs gter rang ‘grel, Sa Paṇ argues extensively against the Phya pa tradition’s 
position that don spyi is an object of conceptual thought. In this section of the ‘Direct Perception’ 
chapter, Sa Paṇ clearly does not feel the need to restate his case in detail and only notes the issue 
briefly.
32 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 226.25–7; TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 31a.5–6: 
kha cig don spyi dzin pa zhes brjod na mu stegs dbang shes rtog bcas su ‘dod pa la ma khyab po zhes 
zer mod kyi de lta na sgra don ‘dzin pas kyang brda la ma byang ba’i rtog pa la ma khab par mtshungs 
so /.
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in the definition, since both instances are of a similar type (rigs gcig pa) in terms of 
constituting conceptual thought.33
Elaborating on this issue, Go-rams pa more specifically comments that some 
Indians (rgya gar ba kha cig) (Śāntarakṣita, for instance) (Jha 1937, verses 1214–26), 
postulate that Dharmakīrti used the term ‘capable’ in order to include the conceptual 
thought-continuum of an infant (byis pa), who is ignorant of the meanings of 
words; the infant’s thought process is not covered (ma khyab pa) by the definition 
which stipulates the ‘cognition (possessing conceptual thought) that apprehends the 
object associated with words’ (sgra don ‘dzin pa’i blo). Furthermore, pointing out an 
alternative case similar to Sa Paṇ, Go-rams pa utilises the example of an older man 
(rgan po) who does in fact have access to words (which are associated with the object). 
In this case, the older man’s conceptual thought-continuum is not covered by the 
definition stipulating that a cognition is an ‘apprehension capable’ (rung ba ‘dzin pa) 
of associating; since the older man’s cognition does in fact have access to a cognition 
that possesses an apprehension associated (‘dres pa ‘dzin pa) with verbalisation. 
Regarding the definitions of conceptual thought that may include either the qualifier 
‘apprehension capable’ (rung ‘dzin pa) of associating or ‘apprehension associating’ 
(‘dres pa ‘dzin pa), for Go-rams pa, like Sa Paṇ, there is not fault in considering either 
as allowable with respect to utilising them as a characteristic of conceptual thought 
that should be absent in pratyakṣa.34 
After completing the overview regarding Sa Paṇ’s qualifiers (rung ‘dzin pa and 
‘dres pa ‘dzin pa), Go-rams pa goes one step further and briefly annotates an expanded 
list of definitions of conceptual thought that can be equally considered as excludable 
in this system (bstan): 
• a cognition that apprehends a term-(universal) and an object-(universal) as 
associated;
• a cognition that apprehends a term-(universal) and an object-(universal) as 
capable of being associated; 
• a cognition that apprehends the object (associated) with words;
• a cognition that apprehends an object-universal.35
33 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 227.1–4; TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 31a.6–
31.b.1: kha cig brda la ma byang ba’i rtog pa bsdu ba’i phyir brjod pa sgra dang ‘drer rung ‘dzin pa 
zhes zer na ‘ng ‘dres pa ‘dzin pa la ma khyab bo / mtshan nyid rigs la ‘jog pas mi ‘gal lo zhe na / de lta 
na de dag gang ltar brjod kyang rigs gcig pas ‘gal ba med do /.
34 Go-rams pa 1975, 126.3–9 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 62.a.2–3: rgya gar ba kha 
cig / brda la ma byang ba’i byis pa’i rgyud kyi rtog pa bsdu ba’i ched du yin te / sgra don ‘dzin pa’i blo 
des / de la ma khyab pa’i phyir zhes smra ba ni cig shos la yang mtshungs te / rung ba ‘dzin pa’i blo 
des brda byed rgan po’i rgyud kyi rtog pa la ma khyab pa’i phyir / gal te rung ba ‘dzin pa’i rigs la ‘jog 
pas skyon med ce na / sngam la yang mtshungs te / ‘dres pa ‘dzin pa’i rigs la ‘jog pa’i phyir ro /.
35 Go-rams pa 1975, 126.9–13 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 62.a.3–4: mdor na ‘dir 
bstan gyi bral bya rtog pa’i mtshan nyid / sgra don ‘dres pa ‘dzin pa’i dang / sgra don ‘dres rung ‘dzin 
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In laying out the above differing types of conceptual thought, Go-rams pa takes into 
consideration developments subsequent to Sa Paṇ in relation to Tibetan writers’ views 
as to how to understand Dharmakīrti’s intent regarding the term sgra don (śabdārtha). 
Tibetan writers generally accept Dharmakīrti’s inclusion of the sgra don qualification, 
but they vary in their understanding of how the term is to be understood. While 
not directly identifying the intended target of his criticism, Go-rams pa seemingly 
includes reference to the definitions developed by Dge ‘dun grub pa, Rgyal tshab rje, 
and Mkhas grub rje of the Dge lugs-Gsang phu tradition. As represented in the second 
of the four definitions outlined above, Go-rams pa appears to refer to Dge ‘dun grub, 
who set up a definition of conceptual thought that separates sgra don (śabdārtha) as 
a conjunctive compound (dvandva), to wit, terms (sgra) and objects (don), taking 
‘term’ to signify term-universal (sgra spyi) and ‘object’ for object-universal (don spyi) 
(Dge ‘dun grub pa 1985, fol. 37).36 Hence, Dge ‘dun grub lays out a definition of 
conceptual thought as ‘a cognition that apprehends a term-(universal) and an object-
(universal) as capable of being associated’; this definition being somewhat based on 
the P.Vin (Dge ‘dun grub ba 1985, fol. 36).37 Go-rams pa’s third example above can 
be seen to refer to Mkhas grub rje, who, basing his definition on the PV, understands 
sgra don as a genitive compound (tatpuruṣa), and describes conceptual thought as ‘a 
cognition that apprehends the object (associated with) words’ (Mkhas grub dge legs 
dpal bzango po 1982, fol. 57.a.5).38 Like Sa Paṇ, Go-rams pa comments that these 
types of conceptual thought should be known as being without distinction (khyad 
par med pa, abheda) in the sense that all are equally absent whenever a valid case of 
direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) occurs. 
2.B.1.A.1.B.2.B. Ascertaining the meaning of ‘without error’  
(Verse III continued)
In examining the meaning of ‘without error’ (ma ‘khrul pa, abhrānta) in the definition 
of mngon sum (pratyakṣa), Sa Paṇ and subsequently Go-rams pa initially lead off 
the discussion by discounting three alternate views about the purported meaning 
of ‘without error’. Accordingly, they dismiss the following three explanations of 
pa’i dang / sgra don ‘dzin pa’i dang / don spyi ’dzin pa’i zhe na blo rnams khyad par med par shes par 
bya’o /.
36 See also Dreyfus 1997, 221 and Tillemans 1999, 238, n. 22, where the issue of interpreting the 
sgra don (śabdārtha) is also discussed.
37 Tillemans 1999, 239, n. 22 comments that Rgyal tshab rje also accepted this interpretation of 
the term sgra don.
38 It should be noted that Mkhas grub dge also strenuously argues against Dge ‘dun drub and 
Rgyal tshab’s understanding of sgra don as sgra spyi and don spyi (see Tshad ma sde bdun, fol. 57.a: 
it is not correct to hold that the words ‘term’ and ‘object’ refer to term and object universal).
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‘without error’ (Sa Paṇ’s reason for discounting the various explanations has been 
included parenthetically): 
• Some scholars who according to the Vijñānavādin system (rnam rig pa’i 
grub mtha) accept ‘without error’ as meaning ‘non-deceptive’ (mi bslu ba, 
avisaṃvāda). (Sa Paṇ contends that this is not correct, since non-deceptive 
is also present with regards to the object of application (‘jug yul) of inference 
(rjes dpag, anumāna).)
• Some who accept (pratyakṣa as being ‘without error’) concerning (ldan pa) 
the truly existent object (yul bden). (Sa Paṇ contends that in this instance exa-
mining direct perception according to the ultimate truth (don dam bden pa, 
paramārtha-satya) is not the heart of the matter, i.e. the relevant point.)
• Some who accept ‘without error’ as a direct perception that is ‘without error’ 
regarding the held object (gzung yul). (Sa Paṇ does not accept this since it does 
not follow (ma khyab, avyāpti) in the case of introspective direct perception 
(rang rig mngon sum, svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa) and yogic direct perception 
(rnal ‘byor mngon sum, yogi-pratyakṣa.)39
39 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 227.8–12; TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita, 1968, fol. 31.b.2–
31.b.4: ma ‘khrul pa’i don kha cig rnam rig pa’i grub mtha’ ltar mi bslu ba la ‘dod pa dang / kha cig 
yul bden pa dang ldan pa la ‘dod pa dang / kha cig gzung yul ma ‘khrul pa la ‘dod pa ni slob dpon 
gyi dgongs pa ma yin te mi bslu ba tsam rjes dpag gi ‘jug yul la ’ang yod cing / don bden pa brtags 
na snying po med cing / gzung yul don byed nus pa la byed na rang rig dang rnal ‘byor mngon sum la 
ma khyab ste /. Cf. Go-rams pa 1975, 126.17–20 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 62.a.5–6, 
where Go-rams pa lays out the same three alternative views that should be discounted, as Sa Paṇ 
does; Go-rams pa, however, does not feel compelled to repeat the reasons why they are incorrect, 
which have been previously included by Sa Paṇ.
Concerning the reference in the first bullet to those scholars who relate ‘without error’ as mea-
ning ‘non-deceptive’ (mi bslu ba, avisaṃvāda), Sa Paṇ is likely referring to Vinītadeva, who explains 
in his commentary on the Nyāyabindu ‘abhrānta means “without error”, that is to say, “non-decep-
tive” regarding the object attained’ (‘khrul ba med pa ni ma khrul ba ste / thob bar byed pa’i yul la 
phyin ci ma log /), de la Vallée Poussin 1907, 40. For further discussion, see also Stewart 1983, Intro-
duction section, discussing ‘Authority and Direct Perception’; and Dreyfus 1997, 349.
Concerning Sa Paṇ’s third bullet, which rejects those who accept ‘without error’ in the definition 
of direct perception as regarding the (external) held object (gzung yul), Go-rams pa further supports 
Sa Paṇ’s assertion when explaining Svasaṃvedana and Yogi-pratyakṣa; he notes that no external 
‘held object’ is involved in either of these two varieties of perception. Regarding Svasaṃvedana-
pratyakṣa (rang rig mngon sum), Go-rams pa notes (Go-rams pa 1975, 144.6–13 and TMRGDG in 
Go-rams pa 1969b, fol. 70.b.):
de la gnyis snang dang bcas pa dang / gnyis snang med pa’I rang rig mngon sum gnyis las / dang 
po ni / blo cig nyid gzung rnam dang ‘dzin rnam gnyis su snang ba na / gzung bar snang bam 
yang bya dang / ‘dzin par snang myong byed du snang ba’i gnas skabs su snang pa’i rang rig de 
nyid yin la / gnyis pa ni / shes pa thams cad kyi steng gi rang gi ngo bo myong tsam du skyes pa’i 
cha de nyid do /
There are two types kinds of svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa, to wit, a svasaṃavedana-pratyakṣa ha-
ving a dual appearance and a svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa without a dual appearance. The first one 
is when a single cognition (blo, buddhi) appears as both the objective aspect, lit. ‘held aspect’ 
(grāhyākāra), and the subjective aspect, lit. ‘holding aspect’ (grāhakākāra), namely, it is just the 
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Somewhat leniently Sa Paṇ comments that the above interpretations are not the 
intent (dgongs pa) of Ācārya (Dharmakīrti) in the current circumstance, whereas 
Go-rams pa more directly criticises these interpretations as being contradicted by 
reasoning (rigs pas gnod pa, yukti-viruddha).
As for the intended purpose of ‘without error’, both the TMRGRG and TMRGDG 
highlight that it is the pratyakṣa that is not produced as an errant cognition through the 
causes of error (‘khrul rgyu, vibhramakāraṇa) situated in the sense basis (dbang po, 
indriya), the one situated on the object (yul, viṣaya), through activity (bya ba, karma), 
etc. In support of the above, the Sa skya scholars refer to P.Vin, where Dharmakīrti 
while commenting on I.4a. states:
In that (pratyakṣa), ‘without error’ is not having error invested through the effect of 
cataracts, quickly whirling (e.g., a fire brand), travelling on a boat, and confusion, etc.40
svasaṃvedana with an appearance of a situation that is appearing as the apprehensible appea-
rance to be experienced (gzung bar snang bam yang bya) and what experiences the apprehended 
appearance (‘dzin par snang ba myong byed). The second one is just that part of every cognition 
which merely experiences its bare nature. 
Hence, there is no reference to an external ‘held object’ (gzung yul) in the description of svasaṃvedana. 
And when laying out yogi-pratyakṣa, Sa Paṇ explains, ‘Prat.’ 44 (TMRG and TMRGRG both in Sa-
skya Paṇḍita 2005, 24.9 and 235.11, respectively):
bsgom byung ‘khrul med mngon sum ste /
(Yogi-pratyakṣa) is a direct perception without error arisen from contemplation. 
And in his auto-commentary, Sa Paṇ explains (TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 235.13–4):
de la rnal ‘byor gyi shes pa tsam gyi mtshan nyid ni bsgoms pa’i stobs las snang pa yin no / rnal 
‘byor mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid ni bsgoms pa las byung ba ma ‘khrul pa’i shes rab bo //
In this regard, the simple definition, the cognition of a yogi appears from contemplation 
(bhāvanā). [Furthermore], the defining characteristic of yogi-pratyakṣa (rnal ‘byor mngon sum) 
is a non-erroneous insight (prajñā) arisen from contemplation.
Expanding on Sa Paṇ’s comment, Go-rams pa adds (Go-rams pa 1975, 149.11–4 and TMRGDG in 
Go-rams pa 1969b, fol. 73.a):
rang gi thun mong ma yin pa’i bdag rkyen yang dak pa’i don la sgom byung gtso bor gyur pa’i ting 
nge ‘dzin la brten nas yang dag pa’i don la ma ‘khrul ba’i rig pa’o / 
The defining characteristic of yogi-pratyakṣa is a cognition that is ‘without error’ regarding the 
‘right object’ (samyag-artha); having consciousness-support in the salient Samadhi (ting nge 
‘dzin) arisen chiefly in that contemplation of the ‘right object’ amounting to its own specific (thun 
mong ma yin pa, asādhāraṇa) governing condition.
Finally, Sa Paṇ notes ‘Prat.’ 103 (TMRG and TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 25.10. and 235.11, 
respectively):
gzung ‘dzin med phyir ‘khrul med ‘grub /
Because it lacks the objective (apprehensible) and the subjective (apprehending), (yogi-
pratyakṣa) is established as lacking error.
Again, there is no reference to an external ‘held object’. (I plan to explore Sa Paṇ and Go rams pa’s 
views on yogi-pratyakṣa in an upcoming work.)
40 Cf. TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 227. 15–7: ma ‘khrul pa’i don rnam nges las / rab rib 
dang myur du bskor ba dang grur zhugs pa dang ‘khrul pa la sogs bas ‘khrul pa ma bsked pa zhes 
gsungs pas dbang po dang yul dang bya ba la sogs pa’i ‘khrul pa’i rgyud de dag dang brul ba nyid yin 
no /. And Go-rams pa 1975, 126.19–127.1: rnam nges las / de la ma ‘khrul ba ni rab rib dang / myur 
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Aligning Dharmakīrti’s description of ‘without error’ with Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa’s 
elaboration, ‘the effect of cataracts’ can be paired with the error produced through the 
senses, ‘quickly whirling’ can be paired with the error produced through the object, 
and the error resulting from ‘travelling on a boat’ can be joined with activity.41 The 
TMRGDG highlights the possibility that there may be individuals who propose that 
given the parameters laid out above by Dharmakirit regarding the conditions under 
which a pratyakṣa can arise as erroneous, then even ‘conceptual thought’ (rtog pa, 
vikalpa) could also be considered to be ‘without error’; since ‘conceptual thought’ 
does not arise from the causes mentioned above. More specifically, Go-rams pa 
stipulates that others may contend that ‘conceptual thought’ would be ‘without error’ 
because it is not produced as erroneous through those causes of error delimited under 
Dharmakirit’s explanation. Go-rams pa disagrees and notes that the term ‘et cetera’ 
(adi, sogs) is included by Dharmakīrti in order to cover other causes of error, such 
as the error which is ‘established by means of “conceptual thought” arisen from the 
beginningless propensity (thog med bag chags, anādivāsanā)’ (to view the world as 
such and such), and ‘that error that is created by habitually perceiving (the world) 
from time immemorial (thog med pa’i dus can, anādikālina)’.42
2.B.1.A.1.B.2.C. Ascertaining the purpose of both ‘without conceptual  
thought and without error’ (Verse III continued)
When addressing the purpose of both aspects of Dharmakīrti’s definition of direct 
perception, Go-rams pa restates the comment he made at the outset of the discussion 
of the purpose of the defining characteristic of direct perception in terms of a rhetorical 
du bskor ba dang / grur zhugs pa dang ‘khrul pa la sogs pas ‘khrul par mi sked cing / zhes gsungs pa 
ltar / dbang po dang / yul dang / bya ba la sogs pa’i ‘khrul rgyus ‘khrul par mi skyed pa’o /. Cf. the 
Sanskrit of Dharmakīrti’s comment on P.Vin I.4a:
tatra abhrāntam timirāśubhramaṇanauyānasaṃkṣobhādyanāhitavibhramam /
41 Cf. also Dge ‘dun grub ba 1985, fol. 38.3–10 where a similar pairing of the four types/causes 
of error and their manifestations is laid out. Regarding the error resulting from ‘travelling on a boat’, 
which is paired with ‘activity’ (bya ba), this is sometimes explained as an error resulting in location 
(gnas la yod pa) (as does Dge ‘dun grub ba above). See also Wayman 1999, 17, in his presentation of 
his translation of Asaṅga’s ‘Hetuvidyā’ section of the Yogācārabhūmi, where the question what is 
karmabhrānti is asked. The answer is ‘the false confidence that is activity where there is no activ-
ity, for example, to see a tree moving alongside while holding up a tight fist’. This is similar to the 
instance where the trees along the shore are mistakenly seen to be moving when one has embarked 
in a boat; which is the example cited by Dharmottara in his Nyāyabindu-tika when explaining the 
cause of error found in the place; see Stcherbatsky 1962, 2: 24.
42 Here Go-rams pa is quoting come from PV ‘Svārthānumāna’ 205.a–b (also occurs in P.Vin 
‘Parārthānumāna’): anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpapariniṣṭhitaḥ (thog me bag chags las byung ba’i / rnam 
par rtog pas yongs sgrub pa) and PV ‘Prat.’ 29.c–d: bhrāntiḥ sā anādikalīnadarśanābhyāsanirmitā 
(gang de ‘khrul pa thog med pa’i / dus can mthong goms kyis sprul yin). See Go-rams pa 1975, 
127.4–7 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 62.b.2.
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question, to wit: are both ‘without conceptual thought’ and ‘without error’ intended to 
eliminate dissimilar types (rigs mi mthun, asajātīya) or are they intended to eliminate 
misunderstanding (log rtog)? Answering his own question, Go-rams pa notes that 
actually a cognition that is ‘without error’ is able eliminate dissimilar types.43 As to 
what constitutes those ‘dissimilar types’ of perception, Go-rams pa earlier delimited 
them as the cognitions that are produced as erroneous through the causes of error 
situated in the senses, etc. Sa Paṇ comments that those who say that both aspects of 
the definition are necessary to eliminate dissimilar types do not know (ma shes pa) 
the meaning of ‘without error’. Clarifying his statement, the TMRGRG adds that in 
fact all conceptual thought (rtog pa thams cad) is erroneous and just by stating that a 
cognition is ‘without error’ also establishes it as ‘without conceptual thought’.44
As a corollary to the above, in a later section of the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter 
(Verse 130–31) when examining the erroneous ‘semblance of direct perception’ 
(mngon sum ltar snang, pratyakṣābhāsa), Sa Paṇ states:
All erroneous cognitions are accepted as a semblance of direct perception.45
Sa Paṇ’s comment highlights that Dharmakīrti added the term ‘without error’ in 
order to draw distinction between pratyakṣa and pratyakṣābhāsa. Similarly, supporting 
Sa Paṇ’s contention, in his A Millennium of Buddhist Logic, Alex Wayman, utilising 
Bu-ston’s commentary on P.Vin ‘Pratyakṣa’s’ examination of ‘semblance of direct 
perception’, notes that Bu-ston’s comments indicate that Dharmakīrti added abhrānta 
to differentiate ‘semblance of perception’ from ‘perception’ (Wayman 1999, 160).
Therefore, both the TMRGRD and TMRGDG support the notion that both 
characteristics are intended for the purpose of eliminating misunderstandings (log 
rtog) and highlight two reasons why both ‘without conceptual thought’ and ‘without 
error’ are included by Dharmakīrti. First, Sa Paṇ notes that ‘without conceptual 
thought’ in addition to ‘without error’ is employed to contradict those individuals 
who mistakenly accept as valid a cognition that is ‘without error’ regarding the ‘held 
object’ (gzung don) while possessing ‘conceptual thought’. Go-rams pa narrows 
down the targets of Sa Paṇ’s criticism to the Vaiśeṣika and the Naiyāyika (bye brag 
dang rigs pa can) and others who mistakenly accept the sense cognition (dbang 
shes, indriya-jñāna) as ‘without error’ while possessing conceptual thought (rtog pa, 
43 Go-rams pa 1975, 127.8–11 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 62.b.3): ‘o na rtog bral 
dang ma ‘khrul ba gnyis ka yang rigs mi mthun sel ba la dgongs sam / log rtog sel ba la dgongs pa yin 
zhes na / yang dag pa na ma ‘khrul ba’i shes pas rigs mi mthun mtha’ dag sel nus…/.
44 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 227.18–20, TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 31.b.5–
31.b.6: kha cig gnyis ka yin no zhes zer ba ni ma ‘khrul pa’i don ma shes pa yin no / des na yang dag 
par na rtog pa thams cad ‘khrul cad ‘khrul pa yin pas ma ‘khrul pa zhes brjod pa nyid kyis rtog bral 
du ‘ang ‘grub …/.
45 See TMRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 25.24: ‘khrul pa’i shes pa thams cad ni / mngon sum ltar 
snang nyid du ‘dod //. See also, Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1976, fol. 32a.3.
72 B R U C E  J .  S T E WA R T
 
kalpanā).46 Second, Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa note that the term ‘without conceptual 
thought’ is included for the purpose of contradicting those who mistakenly consider 
any knowledge that is ‘without error’ regarding its object of application (‘jug yul, 
grāhyārtha) to be conclusively established as being ‘without error’. Following this 
line of reasoning, they rhetorically ask whether inference (rjes dpag, anumāna) 
can also be considered to be ‘without error’.47 As noted previously, according to 
Dharmakīrti, since inference is accompanied by conceptual thought, it is necessarily 
also accompanied by error. Thus, even though inference can be considered a pramāṇa 
in that it is non-deviant with regard to its object of application by having a necessary 
connection (saṃbandha) with that object, there is error in that conceptual thought 
functioning by apprehending its own appearance, which is not the object, to be the 
[actual] object (see Tillemans 1999, 210).
2.B.1.A.2. The variegation of what is to be defined 
(mtshon bya, lakṣya)
Go-rams pa indicates that five issues need to be addressed when examining the 
variegation of what is defined, to wit:
A. the basis (gzhi, ādhāra) on which the variegation is made;
B. the essence (ngo bo, svabhāva) of what is variegated;
C. the rationale (rgyu mtshan, nimitta) by which the variegation is made;
D. the significance of the manner of making the variegation;
E. what the proper number of the variegation is. 
2.B.1.A.2.A. The basis (gzhi, ādhāra) on which the variegation 
is made (Verse IV)
Continuing to illustrate the basic role the ‘without error’ characteristic plays in this 
system, Sa Paṇ’s fourth verse in his ‘Direct Perception’ chapter delimits
46 A full exploration as to why Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa have identified the Vaiśeṣika and 
Naiyāyika as the targets for Dharmakīrti including both aspects of the definition of pratyakṣa is 
beyond the scope of the present effort. It can be briefly noted, however, that Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra 
(I.4) provides the contextual background for Dharmakīrti’s criticism. As laid out in the Nyāya-sūtra, 
the following four criteria need to be met for a cognition to be perceptual: (a) cognition produced by 
sense-object contact; (b) nonverbal (avyapadeśya); (c) nonerroneous (avyabhicārin); and (d) definite 
(or determinate, vyavasāyātmaka).
47 Cf. TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 227.20–2, TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, 
fol. 31.b.6–32.a.1: kha cig rtog pa dang bcas bzhin du gzung don la ma ‘khrul par ‘dod pa dang / kha 
cig ‘jug yul la ma ‘khrul pas kyang ma ‘khrul pa’i go chod pas rjes dpag kyang ma ‘khrul pa yin nam 
snyam pa’i log rtog bzlog pa’i phyir rtog bral smos pa yin no //. And Go-rams pa 1975, 127.11–6 and 
TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 62.b.3–5): rtog bral smos pa ni bye brag pa dang rigs pa can pa 
sogs / dbang shes rtog pa dang bcas bzhin du ma khrul bar ‘dod pa’i log rtog dang / kha cig / ‘jug yul 
la m ‘khrul bas kyang ma ‘khrul bas go chod pas rjes dpag kyang ma ‘khrul ba yin nam snyam pa’i log 
rtog bzlog pa’i ched du smos pa yin no /.
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[t]hat (pratyakṣa) which is ‘without error’ is of four varieties.48
Following Sa Paṇ, Go-rams pa lays out the basis on which the variegation of 
perception is made, stating that it is merely (tsam) a perception that is ‘without error’. 
In commenting on his Verse IV, Sa Paṇ again reiterates that alternatively stating 
both the ‘without error’ and ‘without conceptual thought’ characteristics is just (nyid) 
utilised with respect to addressing those who misunderstand the proper functioning 
of a perception, to wit, the Vaiśeṣika and the Naiyāyika and others who mistakenly 
accept the sense cognition as ‘without error’ while possessing conceptual thought.
2.B.1.A.2.B. The essence (ngo bo, svabhāva) of what is variegated
Both the TMRGRD and TMRGDG identify the well known four-fold division of 
pratyakṣa according to the Dignāga–Dharmakīrti system as the essence of the 
variegation as follows:
• (Outer) sense direct perception (dbang po gyi mngon sum, indriya-pratyakṣa);
• Mental direct perception (yid gyi mngon sum, mānasa-pratyakṣa);
• Introspective direct perception (rang rig gyi mngon sum, svasaṃvedana-
pratyakṣa);
• Yogic direct perception (rnal ‘byor gyi mngon sum, yogi-pratyakṣa).
Presaging the discussion to follow, Sa Paṇ notes that the four perceptions are 
different from one another with respect to their object (yul, viṣaya) but are the same 
taking into account the subject (yul can, viṣayin).49
2.B.1.A.2.C. The rationale (rgyu mtshan, nimitta) by which the variegation 
is made (Verse V and VI)
Sa Paṇ presents the rationale behind the variegation of pratyakṣa in Verse V and VI 
of the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter by stating:
Direct perceptions are sorted in terms of object (yul), support (rten), and person (gang 
zag).50
The TMRGRD and TMRGDG similarly explain this verse. In terms of the object, 
there are two direct perceptions (i.e. indirya and mānasa), which cognise the object 
by means of an outward-directed cognition (gzhan rig, parasaṃvitti) of the object. 
48 See TMRG and TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 23.17 and 227.24, respectively: ma ‘khrul 
pa de rnam pa bzhi //. See also Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1976, fol. 29b.1.
49 Cf. TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 227.27–228.1, TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 
32.a.2–3: de dag yul la ltos nas tha dad / yul can la ltos nas gcig yin no //.
50 See TMRG and TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 23.17–8 and 228.2–3, respectively: yul dang 
rten dang gang zag gi // sgo nas mngon sum rnam pa dbye //. See also Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1976, fol. 29b.1.
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There is introspective direct perception, which is an inward-directed cognition. And 
finally, in terms of the object there is the yogin’s direct perception, which lacks an 
inner and outer directed cognition of the object.51 With respect to the support (rten), 
again there are the two perceptions (i.e. indriya and mānasa) that cognise the external 
object dependent on the sense organs (dbang po). The introspective direct perception 
depends only (tsam) on other dependent phenomena (gzhan dbang, paratantra) and 
the yogin’s direct perception dependent on intense contemplation (ting nge, samādhi). 
In terms of the person (gang zang, pudgala), there are two perceptions: the perception 
of ordinary people (so skye) and the perception of the Āryas (‘phags pa). 
2.B.1.A.2.D. The significance of the manner of making the variegation
Go-rams pa notes that the significance concerning how the four direct perceptions 
are differentiated is not simply a distinction in order to refute their unity, because 
the four perceptions are discrete things (dngos po, bhāva) able to perform a function, 
nor for Go-rams pa are they merely different aspects (ldog pa tha dad) of a single 
entity (ngo bo gcig), because any one of the four perceptions are substantially different 
from the three other direct perceptions. Nevertheless, Go-rams pa reminds his readers 
that the significance of the differentiation of the four perceptions is not that they are 
substantially different, because the three other perceptions (e.g. indriya, mānasa and 
yogi) are a single entity (ngo bo gcig) with respect to the introspective direct perception 
(rang rig mngon sum). Therefore, Go-rams pa concludes that while any one of the 
four perceptions is substantially different (rdzas tha dad) from the three other direct 
perceptions and the three (indriya, mānasa and yogi) are a single entity (ngo bo gcig) 
with introspective direct perception, the real significance as to how the four direct 
perceptions are differentiated ‘is that they are different in terms of their object’.52
51 Cf. TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 228.5–6: mngon sum de ‘ng yul gyis dbye na yul gzhan 
mthong ba don rig gnyis dang / rang mthong ba rang rig dang / ran gzhan med par mthong ba rnal 
‘byor gyi mngon sum mo // and Go-rams pa 1975, 127.22–128.2: yul gyi sgo nas / yul gzhan rig pa 
don rig gi mngon sum gnyis / rang rig pa rang rig gi mngon sum / rang gzhan med par rig pa rnal 
‘byor mngon sum mo //. See also Wayman 1999, 273–74, where Wayman’s translation of Tsong-kha 
pa’s Sde bdun la ‘jug pa’i sgo don gnyer yid mun sel also characterises indriya and mānasa pratyakṣa 
as outward directed cognitions (gzhang rig, parasaṃvitti) and svasaṃvedana pratyakṣa as a cognition 
that focuses only on the inner side (of the mind) (kha nang kho nar phyogs pa).
52 Go-rams pa 1975, 128.6–11 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.a.2: bzhi pa ni gcig pa 
bkag pa’i tha dad ma yin te / bzhi ka yang dngos po yin pa’i phyir / ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa 
tsam yang ma yin te / mngon sum gzhan gsum rdzas tha dad yin pa’i phyir / rdzas tha dad kyang ma 
yin te / mngon sum gzhan gsum po rang rig mngon sum dang ngo bo gcig yin pa’i phyir / des na mngon 
sum gzhan gsum po rdzas tha dad dang / de gsum rang rig mngon sum dang no bo gcig la / yul gyi sgo 
nas tha dad yin no /. Go-rams pa is on his own as he nuances the significance of the manner on mak-
ing the variegation among the four direct perceptions. Sa Paṇ appears content, at least in this section 
of the TMRG and TMRGRG, with simply stating that those (four direct perceptions) are different 
from one another with respect to their object; see TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 227.27–228.1.
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2.B.1.A.2.E. What is the proper number of the variegation?  
(Verse VII and VIII)
Addressing the proper number (grangs) of varieties of direct perception, Sa Paṇ’s 
Verse VII and VIII of the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter states:
There are four varieties of direct perception in the view of the Sautrāntika, three according 
to the view of the Vaibhāṣika, and two according to Vijñānavādin.53
The circumstances regarding the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika appear to be the 
most straightforward. Both Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa acknowledge the fourfold division 
of pratyakṣa in the case of the Sautrāntika when accepting the external object (phyi 
rol gyi don zhal gyis bzhes pa). Concerning the Vaibhāṣika, Sa Paṇ’s sole comment 
in this section is simply that ‘the Vaibhāṣika do not accept introspection as a direct 
perception’—leaving sense, mental, and yogi direct perception as the varieties of 
direct perception accepted by the Vaibhāṣika. Go-rams pa does not deem it necessary 
to further comment at this point on the Vaibhāṣika’s position vis-à-vis their accepted 
varieties of direct perception.
The situation is not as clear-cut with respect to the Vijñānavādin. Since Sa Paṇ’s 
root text declares that the Vijñānavādin accept a twofold division of direct perception, 
the first question that arises is which two direct perceptions, according to Sa Paṇ, are 
accepted by the Vijñānavādin? In setting up the discussion, Go-rams pa hints that the 
situation is not as simple as it may appear, noting that some scholars have interpreted 
Sa Paṇ’s Verse VII and VIII literally (sgra ji bzhin du); thereby those scholars have 
incorrectly understood his intent and as a result of their misunderstanding have 
stated that in the view of the Vijñānavādin sense and mental direct perception are not 
present, leaving the Sautrāntika as the only position adhering to the fourfold division 
of pratyakṣa.54 While Sa Paṇ’s auto-commentary eventually notes that Dharmakīrti’s 
final intention is that in the view of the Vijñānavādin other than introspective direct 
perception and the yogin’s direct perception no other valid means of perception is 
possible;55 in the preamble building to this conclusion Sa Paṇ also indicates that 
there is more to the situation than meets the eye in terms of sense and mental direct 
perception vis-à-vis the Vijñānavādin.
53 See TMRG and TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 23.18–9 and 228.9–10 respectively: mngon 
sum bzhi po mdo ste’i lugs / bye brag smra gsum rnam rig gnyis //. See also Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1976, fol. 
29b.1–2.
54 Go-rams pa 1975, 128.15–18 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.a.4: ‘di la kha cig / 
sgra ji bzhin du / rnam rig pa’i lugs la / dbang yid kyi mngon sum gnyis med pas / bzhir phye ba mdo 
sde pa kho na’i lugs yin zhes smra ‘o /.
55 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 228.21–2, TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 32.b.2: 
rnam rig pa’i lugs ltar na rang rig pa dang / rnal ‘byor gyi mngon sum gnyis las / gzhan mi srid pa 
dpal ldan grags pa’i dgongs pa yin no //.
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In the discussion surrounding Verse VII and VIII, Sa Paṇ and to a greater degree 
Go-rams pa unpack their understanding of how one should interpret the correct 
number of pratyakṣas in terms of the Vijñānavādin, as well as adding further precision 
regarding the purpose of each of the four accepted pratyakṣas for the Sautrāntika. 
The issue focuses on how to understand the possible role of and conditions under 
which sense and mental direct perception can be considered within the Vijñānavādin. 
Following his Indian predecessors (such as Mokṣākaragupta), Sa Paṇ initiates the 
discussion by appealing to scriptural authority, quoting from the Saṁyutta Nikāya 
in an effort to establish a basis for holding sense and mental direct perception as 
justifiable: 
O Bhikṣus, the cognition of form (gzugs, rūpa) is twofold, i.e. that of the eye (mig, cakṣus) 
and of mind (yid, manas).56
Sa Paṇ follows the appeal to scriptural authority with what would seem to be 
a reference to verses I and II of Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣā (dmigs pa brtags pa), 
where Dignāga states that the atom (rdul phran, paramāṇu), either in aggregation 
(‘dus pa) or in a multitude (bsags pa), cannot be an object of perception. Sa Paṇ 
presents a would-be questioner (perhaps a Vaibhāṣika or a Sautrāntika) who, referring 
to the early section of Ālambanaparīkṣā, claims that when mental direct perception 
is not established as a means of valid cognition, then sense direct perception is also 
not established as a means of valid cognition because of rejecting the notion that the 
atom (rdul phran, paramāṇu) is the object of perception.57 While the initial verses 
56 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 228.12, TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 32.a.5: mdo 
las / dge slong dag gzushes pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / mig dang yid do / zhes gsungs pa’i dgongs pa 
yin no /. Go-rams pa also cites this verse in a later section of the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter while 
providing an in-depth examination of mānasa pratyakṣa in a section entitled ‘Identifying the Valid 
Position’ (‘thad pa’i phyogs ngos bzung) (for the arising of mental direct perception); see Go-rams pa 
1975, 138.11 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 67.b.5). Cf. Feer 1884–1904, 1: 29. The same 
or at least a very similar verse is also cited in the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta and Nyāyabindu 
ṭīkā-ṭippaṇī, where the Sanskrit can be found (dvābhyāṁ bhikṣavo rūpaṁ dṛśyate cakṣur vijñānena 
tadākṛṣṭena manovijñāneneti), see Kajiyama 1966, 47, and Stcherbatsky 1909, 26.10, respectively.
57 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 228.14–5, TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 32.a.6: 
‘o na yid kyi mngon sums tshad mas mi ‘grub bo zhe na / dbang po’i mngon sum yang tshad mas mi 
‘grub ste / rdul phran ‘gog pa’i phyir ro /. In Ālambanaparīkṣā, Verse I–II, Dignāga focuses on demon-
strating how atoms (rdul phran, paramāṇu) cannot be the object of perception (blo yi yul du), either 
in aggregation (‘dus pa) or in a multitude (bsags pa). Dignāga is distinguishing between atoms in 
aggregation or in a multitude and not that there are in fact atoms. Cf. Sastri 1942. Further on in Go-
rams pa 1975, 136.22 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 67.a.2 in the section entitled ‘Proving 
Mental Direct Perception as an Authority’ when discussing how despite certain things being true, 
when considered according to convention, they may not be mentioned as such, Go-rams pa uses the 
atom as an example as follows: 
dper na dbang shes kyi yul rdul phra rab yin yang tha snyad du yul gyi tha snyad mi byed pa bzhin no / 
For example, the atom is the object of sense cogntion, but in convention it is not mentioned as 
the object.
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(I–V) of the Ālambanaparīkṣā entail an examination of how atoms cannot serve as 
the object of cognition (blo yi yul du) as part of presenting the opponents’ position 
(pūrva-pakṣa/anya-samaya), Dignāga does not deny that an atomic-object is real and 
in fact in other texts, such as the PS, is referred to as a svalakṣaṇa. Sa Paṇ follows this 
objection with a statement indicating the atom can be viewed as a real external-object 
that plays a casual role along with the sense organ as a cooperating capacity, thereby 
substantiating the validity of indriya and manasa pratyakṣa for the Vijñānavādin 
under certain conditions, to wit, ‘with the acceptance of the external object (phyi rol gi 
khas blangs nas), sense direct perception is established’. Under these circumstances, 
how can one oppose that mental direct perception then apprehends (the accepted 
external object) immediately after that (sense direct perception).58
Substantiating Sa Paṇ’s claim that the Vijñānavādin (Cittamātra) can also be seen 
as upholding a view of a fourfold division of pratyakṣa, Go-rams pa specifically 
identifies Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣā (dmigs pa brtags pa) as a source to support this 
view. Regarding the Ālambanaparīkṣā, Go-rams pa notes that since this work includes 
an explanation of the three conditions (kyen, pratyaya) of sense direct perception 
according to the view of the Cittamātra (sems tsam pa), there is the Cittamātra’s 
implicit acceptance of sense direct perception. Continuing, Go rams pa concisely 
summarises Sa Paṇ’s TMRGRG above discussion concerning the connection between 
sense and mental direct perception by stating that ‘when one accepts sense direct 
perception, then one ought to accept mental direct perception’.59
Go-rams pa also disagrees with those (a possible reference to followers of Phya 
pa) who interpret Sa Paṇ’s Verse VII and VIII as indicating the number of direct 
perceptions for each system (Sautrāntika, Vijñānavādin, etc) with respect to those 
direct perceptions which are ‘without error’ towards the ‘appearing object’ (snang 
yul). Go-rams pa notes that such an interpretation is incorrect because it would require 
58 TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 228.16–7, TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 32.a.6–
32.b.1: phyi rol gyi don khas blangs nas ‘grub bo zhe na / de ltar na yid kyi mngon sum yang de’i de ma 
thag pa ‘dzin pas ga la ‘gal /. Cf. Dharmakīrti’s P.Vin, ‘Prat.’ 19.a–c (as quoted in Go-rams pa 1975, 
138.16 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 67.b.6):
dbang shes de ma thag rkyen las / byung zhin de don de ma thag /
‘dzin par byed pa’i yid kyang ngo / 
Also, mental (awareness) arises from the sense cognition that is the immediately preceding con-
dition, and it freshly apprehends the object.
59 Go-rams pa 1975, 128.18–22 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.a.5: dmigs brtag las 
/ sems tsam pa’i lugs la / dbang mngon gyi rkyen gsum bshad pas dbang mngon khas blang dgos shing 
/ dbang mngon ‘dod na yid mngon kang ‘dod dgos par rigs gter rang ‘grel nyid las bshad pa’i phyir /. 
The three conditions (khyen) of sense perception are the object condition (ālambana-pratyaya, dmigs 
khyen), the controlling condition (adhipati-pratyaya, dgag rkyen), and the immediately preceding 
condition (samanantara-pratyaya, de ma thag rkyen). See also Wayman 1999, 282–85, where Way-
man’s translation of Tsong-kha pa’s Sde bdun la ‘jug pa’i sgo don gnyer yid mun sel presents an outline 
of the above three conditions of sense cognitions according to the Cittamātra School.
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acceptance by Vijñānavādin that both sense and mental direct perception are ‘without 
error’ regarding that ‘appearing object’ that becomes the object of direct perception.60
After taking exception to the incorrect manner in which others have interpreted 
these two verses of Sa Paṇ, Go-rams pa lays out what he considers to be the correct 
understanding of Sa Paṇ’s presentation of the proper numbers of varieties of direct 
perception. Go-rams pa notes that if presented according to the conventional view 
(tha snyad, vyavahāra), both sense and mental direct perception are accepted by the 
Vijñānavādin as means of valid cognition concerning the external object (phyir rol 
gyi don, bāhyārtha). Go-rams pa however points out that the true number of the 
variegation that is indicated in Sa Paṇ’s treatise is being examined according to the 
ultimate abiding nature (don dam gnas lugs). In this case therefore, neither sense nor 
mental direct perception can possibly be upheld a means of valid cognition for the 
external object for the Vijñānavādin.61
The TMRGDG notes that for the Vijñānavādin, in terms of the ultimate abiding 
nature, there is only introspective direct perception (rang rig mngon sum, svasaṃvedana-
60 Go-rams pa 1975, 128.22–129.4 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.a.6: kha cig 
gzhung de’i don / snang yul la ma ‘khrul ba’i mngon sum gyi dbang du byas yin zhes gsungs pa yang 
mi ‘thad de / dbang yid kyi mngon sum gnyis / gang la mngon sum du song ba’i snang yul de la / ma 
‘khrul bar rnam rig pas kyang len dgos pa’i phyir ro /. See Dreyfus 1997, 379 for an overview of 
Phya pa’s (therein referred to as Cha ba) typologies of objects, which in addition to the appearing 
object (snang yul) includes the held object (gzung yul), the object of application (‘jug yul), and the 
conceived object (zhen yul). Dreyfus notes when comparing the Ge-luk traditions with Phya pa that 
they ‘understand the notion of object realistically, at least as far as perception is concerned. The 
appearing object of perception is the real object that appears to it’ (p. 382). Taking Dreyfus’ com-
ment in conjunction with the well-known Buddhist mythological theory of the fixed or six destinies 
(gati), including the hungry ghosts (preta), men, and gods, all of whom view external objects dif-
ferently. Using a river as the example, the hungry ghosts see it as full of pus, the gods seeing it as 
lapis lazuli, and so on. The stream itself was not denied; it is the erroneously reported nature of the 
external object that is arisen from the beginning less propensity (thod med bag chags, anādivāsanā) 
to see the world as such and such and the error that is created by habitually perceiving the world 
from time immemorial (thog med pa’i dus can, anādikālina). Thus for the Cittamātra, sense and 
mental direct perception would certainly have to contain error vis-a-vis reporting the appearing 
object (snang yul).
61 Go-rams pa 1975, 129.4 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.b.1: ‘o na gzhung ‘di’i 
dgongs pa ji ltar zhe na / tha snyad kyi dbang du byas na / dbang yid kyi mngon sum gnyis po phyi 
rol don la tshad mar rnam rig pas kha blangs kyang / ‘dir bstan gyi grangs nges ni don dam gnas lugs 
la dpyod pa’i dbang du byas pa yin la / de’i tshe / dbang yid kyi mngon sum gnyis phyi rol gyi don la 
tshad mar ‘gyur bar mi srid par /. It can be noted that there is no denial of the external object, just 
that sense and mental direct perception cannot be considered as means of valid cognition (tshad 
ma, pramāṇa) for the external object in the ultimate abiding (don dam gnas lugs) sense for the 
Vijñānavādin. Further, while beyond the scope of this inquiry, in a later section of his commentary 
on the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter when discussing the definition of the object-condition (ālambana-
pratyaya, dmigs khyen), Go-rams pa stipulates that ‘the object-condition of the perception (vijñāna) is 
defined as that “external object” (phyi don) which directly generates the principal image (rnam pa’i 
cha gtso bor, pradhānākāra) of the object in perception. If applied according to the system of the 
Vijñānavādin, (the ālayavijñāna) can be substituted for the external object’ (see Go-rams pa 1975, 
134.10 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969b, fol. 65.b.6).
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pratyakṣa) regarding its own entity (rang gi ngo bo, svarūpa). Further elaborating, under 
these circumstances (i.e. as for the ultimate abiding nature), Go-rams pa states that 
according to the Vijñānavādin the first three direct perceptions (i.e. indriya, mānasa, 
and svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa) are one and the same in terms of their nature, and they 
are also the same in terms of their object. And as for the yogin’s direct perception 
(rnal ‘byor mngon sum, yogi-pratyakṣa), when it is recognised as introspective direct 
perception, it is the means of valid cognition regarding the true nature (chos nyid, 
dharmatā) of the object. In consequence of which, the yogin’s direct perception is one 
and the same nature with introspective direct perception, though it is recognised as 
different in terms of its object; to wit, it has the true nature of the object as its object.62 
Thus based on the above analysis, Go-rams pa, like Sa Paṇ, also views the twofold 
variegation of direct perception for the Vijñānavādin indicated in the TMRG Verse VII 
and VIII as introspective direct perception and the yogin’s direct perception. 
As for the view of the Sautrāntika, since Sa Paṇ is considering the proper number 
of direct perceptions from the perspective of the abiding reality (gnas lugs), Go-rams 
pa again explains that each of the four perceptions is distinct in terms of its object. 
That is to say:
• introspective direct perception is set forth as the means of valid cognition for 
the cognition (shes pa, jñāna);
• sense direct perception is set forth as the means of valid cognition for the 
external object (phyi rol gyi don, bāhyārtha);
• mental direct perception is set forth as the means of valid cognition relying on 
the external object that is a different substance from the object of sense direct 
perception; and, 
• the yogin’s direct perception is set forth as the means of valid cognition for the 
right object (yang dag pa’i don, samyag-artha).
Supporting his view, Go-rams pa quotes from Sa Paṇ’s Auto-commentary as 
follows, ‘With respect to the view of the Sautrāntika, the proper number of direct 
62 Go-rams pa 1975, 129.10 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.b.2: rang gi ngo bo la 
rang rig mngon sum kho nar ‘gyur bas / mngon sum dang po gsum ngo bo’i sgo nas kyang gcig cing 
/ yul gyi sgo nas gcig pas / rang rig mngon sum du bzhag la / rnal ‘byor mngon sum ni yul chos nyid 
la tshad ma yin bas rang rig mngon sum dang ngo bo gcig kyang / yul gyi sgo nas tha dad du bzhag 
go /. (Note: Go-rams pa bsod nams seng ge 1975, 129.15 omits the terminating particle ’go’ in ‘bzhag 
go’.) While beyond the current scope of this study, it should be noted that in the Tibetan Grub mtha’ 
(siddhānta) materials there is considerable discussion among Buddhists concerning the division 
of Yogacarins into two groups: those that follow scripture (āgama-anusārin) and those that follow 
reason (yukti-anusārin). During this discussion one factor dividing these two group pointed out by 
Lcang-skya Rol-pa’i rdo-rje in his medium length Grub mtha’ is that the yukti-anusārin accept the 
four kinds of direct perception, that is, sense, mental, introspective, and of the yogin. And the āgama-
anusārin rejects introspection while accepting the other three kinds. For further discussion of this 
topic, see Wayman 1977.
80 B R U C E  J .  S T E WA R T
 
perceptions is variegated as four in terms of the object when accepting the presence 
of the external object’.63
Summing up the discussion on the proper number of the varieties of direct 
perception, Go-rams pa concludes by making three points. Concerning introspection 
(rang rig, svasaṃvedana) and having noted above that introspective direct perception 
is the means of valid cognition for the cognition, Go-rams pa now points to an 
additional role for introspection, noting that it should be understood that when one 
recognises the means of valid cognition-as-result (tshad ma ‘bras, pramāṇa-phala) of 
sense cognition in the second phase of realising means of valid cognition-as-result, 
then introspection is explained as the result.64 An extensive discussion of the role of 
introspection vis-à-vis the means of valid cognition-as-result occurs in a later section 
of the TMRG, ‘Mngon Sum’, commencing with Sa Paṇ’s Verses 142–45:
Therein, the tenet systems commonly agree that the means of valid cognition-as-result is 
established as introspection. [However], it is by the force of our tenet system that we say 
the cognition of the external object is established as a means of valid cognition-as-result.65
Furthermore, Go-rams pa notes that one should understand as an essential point 
regarding only the view of the Sautrāntika, that when the Tshad ma rigs gter root text 
and auto-commentary divides direct perception as fourfold in terms of the object 
(yul), acceptance of the external object (phyi don) is implied. And finally, Go-rams pa 
concludes that if one knows to apply the phrase ‘in terms of the object’ (not necessarily 
an external object that should be understood in relation to only the Sautrāntika) at the 
63 Go-rams pa 1975, 129.15 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.b.4: mdo sde pa’i lugs la 
bzhi char yang yul gyi sgo nas tha dad yin te / rang rig mngon sum ni shes pa dang / dbang mngon ni 
phyi rol gyi don dang / yid mngon ni de’i yul las rdzas gzhan pa’i phyi rol gyi don dang / rnal ‘byur 
mngon sum ni yang dag pa’i don la tshad mar ‘jog pa ni gnas lugs kyi dbang du byas pa’i phyir ro / 
de ltar yang rang ‘grel las / mngon sum gyi grangs nges pa ni mdo sde pa’i lugs la brten nas / phyi 
rol gyi do zhal gyis bzhes pa’i tshe yul gyi sgo nas bzhir phye ste / zhes gsungs bas so /. Go-rams pa’s 
reference to Sa Paṇ’s Auto-commentary is quoting the TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 228.11, 
TMRGRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1968, fol. 32.a.5.
64 Go-rams pa 1975, 130.2 and TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969a, fol. 63.b.6: de ltar byas na 
tshad ‘bras gnyis pa’i skabs su dbang shes kyi tshad ‘bras bzhag pa’i tshe rang rig ‘bras bur gsungs 
pa... /. In a later section of the TMRGRD and TMRGDG, Sa Paṇ and Go-rams pa engage in a detailed 
discussion surrounding the various views that developed regarding the conventional expression (tha 
snyad pa) of the means of valid cognition as result (pramāṇa-phala, tshad ‘bras). This discussion 
involves an examination of the various views regarding the different phases (skabs) of the means 
of valid cognition-as-result as outlined by the three great systematisers (srol chen po), referred to 
by Go-rams pa and Sa Paṇ as Dharmottara (chos mchog) and Devendrabuddhi (lha dbang blo). See 
Go-rams pa 1975, 165.3 and the TMRGDG in Go-rams pa 1969b, fol. 80.a.1; and also Stewart 1983, 
322. Cf. Tsong-kha pa’s discussion of the phases of realising the result in relation to the tshad ‘bras 
(pramāṇa-phala) in Wayman 1999, 281.
65 TMRG in Sa-skya Paṇḍita 2005, 26.4: de la rang rig tshad ‘bras ni / rnam gzhag grub mtha’ 
phal cher mthun / don rig smra ba rang rang gi / grub mtha’i stobs gyis tshad ‘bras ‘jog //. See also 
Sa-skya Paṇḍita 1976, fol. 32.a.5.
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beginning of the two verses (Verse VII and VIII) of the Tshad ma rigs gter, then all 
significant points will be self-revealing (rang grol).66
In conclusion, in the above I hope that I have contributed to laying out the genius, 
clarity of thought, and economy of language that Sa Paṇ utilised in his effort to refocus 
and correct various perceived mistakes and misunderstandings that he believed had 
entered into Tibetans understanding of the epistemological system developed by 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Through just the first eight verses of the TMRG’s ‘Direct 
Perception’ chapter in conjunction with Sa Paṇ’s Auto-commentary and Go-rams pa’s 
sub-commentary, the complexity and interconnection of the discussion in relation 
to other Buddhist schools and theories of perception is evident. I look forward to 
exploring and further presenting Sa Paṇ’s discussions of other significant topics such 
as a yogin’s direct perception (yogi-pratyakṣa, rnal ‘byor mngon sum), erroneous 
falsification of direct perception (log phyogs mngon sum, pratyakṣābhāsa), and means 
of valid cognition as result (tshad ma ‘bras bu, pramāṇaphala), to mention just a few.
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